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BABES AND BEEFCAKE: EXCLUSIVE HIRING ARRANGEMENTS
AND SEXY DRESS CODES
ANN C. MCGINLEY*

I. INTRODUCTION: EXCLUSIVE HIRING, BFOQS, AND SEX-SPECIFIC DRESS CODES
Las Vegas casinos exclusively hire women to serve cocktails on the casino
floor, dressing them in tight-fitting, sexy, uncomfortable costumes and high
heels. The exclusive hiring of women as cocktail servers violates Title VII’s
prohibition against sex discrimination unless the employer can demonstrate that
1
being a woman is a bona fide occupational qualification (“BFOQ”) for the job of
2
cocktail server.
3
The courts interpret the BFOQ defense very narrowly. In Int’l Union v.
Johnson Controls, Inc., the Supreme Court held that an employer will prevail
using the BFOQ defense only if sex or the sex-differentiated job qualification
relates to the “essence” or the “central mission” of the employer’s business and
is objectively and verifiably necessary to the employee’s performance of job
4
tasks and responsibilities.
While courts, scholars, and the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) consistently interpret Title VII to forbid employers from

* William S. Boyd Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada,
Las Vegas, J.D., University of Pennsylvania, 1982. My appreciation goes to Deans Richard Morgan
and Joan Howarth for their support, and Bill Boyd and Jim Rogers for providing financial support
for this project. I also thank Jeff Stempel and Elaine Shoben for their comments. Finally, I thank
Deanna Brinkerhoff, who provided excellent research support, and Diana Gleason, Matthew Wright,
and Bobbie Studwell of the Weiner-Rogers Law Library of the Boyd School of Law.
1. The statute provides that it is not an unlawful employment practice for “an employer to hire
and employ employees . . . on the basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in those certain
instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1)
(2000).
2. It is possible that a casino employer would argue that only women applied for the job and
therefore the casino is not discriminating against men because of sex when they hire women cocktail
servers. Nonetheless, if a casino made this argument in response to a lawsuit, plaintiff might be able
to point to the “inexorable zero”—the number of men working in the position of cocktail server. See
Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 342, n.23 (1977) (noting that the company could
not rebut the inference of race discrimination because of the “inexorable zero”— the total absence of
minorities in line driver jobs). Depending on the facts and the court’s orientation, a plausible pattern
and practice case might exist against a casino. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a).
3. See, e.g., Int’l Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 201 (1991); Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 333 (1977).
4. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 201.
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using customer preference as a defense to illegal discrimination, they recognize
the defense to protect consumer preferences in three situations. First, some
courts permit defendants to use the BFOQ defense in health care or prison
situations where the patient or inmate’s fundamental right to personal privacy
6
or safety is at stake. Second, while courts do not recognize a BFOQ defense for
7
employers hiring women for sex appeal, Dean Katharine Bartlett concludes that
sex should be a BFOQ if the central mission of the employer’s business is to sell
8
sex or sexual entertainment. Finally, the EEOC concludes that sex may be a
9
BFOQ to guarantee authenticity in a dramatic production.

5. See, e.g., Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273, 1276–77 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that
stereotyped customer preferences do not justify sexually discriminatory practices); Diaz v. Pan Am.
World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir. 1971) (holding that the airline violated Title VII by
refusing to hire male flight attendants even though customers preferred women for the job); Olsen v.
Marriott Int’l, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1069 (D. Ariz. 1999) (holding that the employer could not
refuse to hire male massage therapists even though women customers preferred women).
6. See Everson v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 391 F.3d 737, 761 (6th Cir. 2004) (upholding the prison’s
BFOQ defense for hiring females only for certain positions in female prisons based on a documented
history of sexual abuse and assaults of the female prisoners by male prison guards); Healey v.
Southwood Psychiatric Hosp., 78 F.3d 128, 134 (3d Cir. 1996) (upholding BFOQ defense of children’s
psychiatric hospital which transferred the female plaintiff, a child care specialist, to the night shift in
order to assure there was at least one woman on every shift because child patients were victims of
sex abuse ); Jennings v. N.Y. State Office of Mental Health, 786 F. Supp 376, 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)
(concluding that there is a BFOQ that at least one person working in a mental health facility as a
Security Hospital Treatment Assistant be a woman to protect the privacy and security of women
patients).
7. See, e.g., Diaz, 442 F.2d at 385 (holding that defendant could not limit its flight attendant
positions to women because customers preferred women’s sex appeal); Wilson v. Sw Airlines, Inc.,
517 F. Supp. 292, 304 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (holding that sex appeal of women flight attendants was not a
BFOQ for the job).
8. Katharine T. Bartlett, Only Girls Wear Barrettes: Dress and Appearance Standards, Community
Norms, and Workplace Equality, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2541, 2577 (1994).
9. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2 (2003) states:
(a)

The commission believes that the bona fide occupational qualification exception as to
sex should be interpreted narrowly. Labels—”Men’s jobs” and “Women’s jobs”—
tend to deny employment opportunities unnecessarily to one sex or the other.
(1) The Commission will find that the following situations do not warrant the
application of the bona fide occupational qualification exception:
(i) The refusal to hire a woman because of her sex based on assumptions of
the comparative employment characteristics of women in general. For
example, the assumption that the turnover rate among women is higher
than among men.
(ii) The refusal to hire an individual based on stereotyped characterization of
the sexes. Such stereotypes include, for example, that men are less capable
of assembling intricate equipment: that women are less capable of
aggressive salesmanship. The principle of nondiscrimination requires that
individuals be considered on the basis of individual capacities and not on
the basis of any characteristics generally attributed to the group.
(iii) The refusal to hire an individual because of the preferences of coworkers,
the employer, clients or customers except as covered specifically in
paragraph (a)(2) of this section.
(2)

Where it is necessary for the purpose of authenticity or genuineness, the
Commission will consider sex to be a bona fide occupational qualification, e.g.,
an actor or actress.
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These exceptions are narrow and may or may not reasonably exclude
casino operators from claiming a BFOQ defense for hiring women exclusively as
cocktail waitresses. Although casinos may have difficulty proving that the
essence of their business is to sell sex, the EEOC’s recognition of authenticity
may support a casino’s BFOQ defense. Casinos will argue that the essence of
their business is entertainment and that young female cocktail servers dressed in
sexy garb represent the epitome of what a Las Vegas casino is: a glamorous
illusion. The casino’s brand identity, the argument goes, is closely related to the
appearance and dress of the cocktail servers, and hiring attractive women and
dressing them in sexy uniforms is related to the essence of the entertainment
business.
Strict appearance and dress codes governing cocktail servers’ uniforms are
closely related to, but not determinative of, the question of whether Title VII
permits casinos to hire women exclusively to serve cocktails on the casino floors.
Without the appearance codes and uniforms required of cocktail servers, the
casinos’ argument that cocktail servers must be women would necessarily fail. It
is not merely women, but women with a particular appearance, that casinos hire
as cocktail servers. In most casinos, cocktail servers are young, shapely, smiling,
and thin. The form-fitting uniforms enhance their sexuality and the illusion that
the cocktail server exists merely to please the male casino customer.
Sitting en banc, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently decided
10
Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., an appearance code case that may have
significant repercussions in Nevada casinos and other similar establishments. In
Jespersen, Harrah’s Casino in Reno, Nevada fired the plaintiff, a female
bartender, for refusing to wear makeup. The Ninth Circuit concluded that sexdifferentiated appearance and grooming codes are legal in jobs held by both
11
men and women unless they impose unequal burdens on men and women.
The Ninth Circuit, however, added an interesting twist. It concluded that a
plaintiff may attack a dress and grooming code under Price Waterhouse v.
12
Hopkins if the code intentionally stereotypes women because of their sex and
the stereotyping objectively interferes with the woman’s ability to perform the
13
job.
Undoubtedly, the uniforms worn by women cocktail servers intentionally
stereotype them because of their sex. After Jespersen, a casino would have to
prove, in response to a lawsuit challenging its dress code, that it is a BFOQ for a
woman cocktail server to dress in a sexy uniform. Assuming that the courts
would conclude that being a woman who dresses in sexy garb is not a BFOQ for
the position of cocktail server, Jespersen raises the question of whether the

10. 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
11. Id. at 1109–10.
12. 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (plurality opinion). In Price Waterhouse, Ann Hopkins challenged her
employer’s failure to make her a partner in the large accounting firm. The Supreme Court concluded
that discrimination based on Hopkins’ failure to conform to stereotyped expectations of the proper
dress and behavior for women was discrimination because of sex. Id. at 255–56.
13. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1111–12 (en banc).
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casinos may legally hire both men and women, and dress both in sexy costumes,
14
which in essence, sexually stereotypes both men and women.
This article examines the strengths and weaknesses of potential legal and
policy arguments concerning whether being a woman dressed in a sexy uniform
is a BFOQ for the job of casino cocktail server. Concluding that being a woman
should not be a BFOQ for the job, this article addresses whether casino owners
may require that women and men cocktail servers wear sexy provocative
uniforms to serve cocktails in Las Vegas casinos.
Part II briefly describes a “typical” cocktail waitress in Las Vegas. Part III
analyzes courts’ and scholars’ interpretations of the proper scope of the BFOQ
defense. Part IV explores both current interpretations and policy considerations
concerning application of the BFOQ defense to Nevada casinos that argue that
being a sexy, young woman is a BFOQ for the job of cocktail server. Part V
addresses whether Jespersen permits casino owners to dress both women and
men cocktail servers in sexually provocative clothing. It asks whether the
unequal burdens test would apply to men and women whose jobs require them
to wear sexually stereotyping clothing and, if so, how the courts should decide
whether particular sexy clothing places an unequal burden on men or women.
Finally, this article concludes that being a woman should not be a BFOQ for
the job of cocktail server, but that Jespersen should permit casinos hiring cocktail
servers and other similar employers whose jobs include an aspect of
performance to require that both men and women wear sexually provocative
uniforms to work. This conclusion should apply, however, only in those jobs
where the employer legitimately sells entertainment and the job itself involves
performance. For industries other than those promoting entertainment and jobs
that do not involve performance, requiring men and women to perform their sex
at work may cause harm to their sense of identity and intrude upon their
15
privacy interests.
16

II. A COCKTAIL SERVER’S JOB

The scantily clad young woman maneuvers through the crowded smoky room,
carrying a tray full of drinks. She wears high heels, long black stockings, a tight-fitting
bustier, and short-shorts, a costume that displays her long legs and ample breasts. Her

14. A threshold question exists: whether Jespersen rightfully decided that the burdens test
applies to jobs held by both men and women and if so, how to apply that test. For an interesting
argument that sex-differentiated grooming codes violate Title VII, see David B. Cruz, Making Up
Women: Casinos, Cosmetics, and Title VII, 5 NEV. L.J. 240, 244–45 (2004), arguing that the BFOQ defense
applies only to hiring and firing and not to conditions of employment.
15. For an interesting discussion concerning the privacy interests of employees in the dress and
grooming at work, see generally Catherine L. Fisk, Privacy, Power, and Humiliation at Work: ReExamining Appearance Regulation as an Invasion of Privacy, 66 LA. L. REV. 1111 (2006). See also Carrie
Yang Costello, Changing Clothes: Gender Inequality and Professional Socialization, 16 NWSA J. 138 (June
2004) (concluding that attempting to comport with professional dress requirements can lead to
“identity dissonance”—”the disconcerting internal experience of conflict between irreconcilable
aspects of their self-concepts”).
16. The following description is of a fictitious cocktail server. However, the conditions and
attitudes described are real composites of information I have learned from observation and
interviews with cocktail servers and other casino or former casino employees.
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hair is fixed and her nails are painted a light pink. She wears carefully-applied
foundation, eye liner and shadow, lipstick, and blush. Although her arms are bare and
the room is very cold, she does not wear a sweater. She always wears a smile as she walks
from table to table serving the patrons in the Las Vegas casino. While some would
consider her look an anachronism, others believe that she looks glamorous, sexy, and
willing to serve; she exudes the aura of a person who has no problems of her own. She is
part of the illusion that Las Vegas sells to its customers. There are no problems in Las
Vegas: Everyone is here to serve the customer.
Before we see her on the casino floor, the cocktail server, who is a single mother,
picked up her two children from school, quickly cooked them dinner and got them started
on their homework. She spent an hour putting on makeup and fixing her hair before
leaving for the casino. Once at the casino, she picked up her uniform from the casino dry
cleaners and dashed to the locker room to dress for the evening. In the locker room, she
dressed in her required clothing, even down to the regulation push-up bra. Last year she
underwent breast augmentation surgery. Her employer offered to pay for it, and she
finds that her tips are better now that her cleavage is deeper and her breasts firmer. She
hastened to attend a required fifteen minute roll-call meeting at the casino when her
supervisor inspected her uniform to ensure that her appearance followed the strict
regulations of the casino. Had she not worn her hair properly, or had she worn flat shoes,
her supervisor may have docked her points or sent her home. Had she worn a sweater,
her supervisor would have reminded her to remove it before she went onto the casino
floor, despite the frigid temperatures.
Now the cocktail server is on the floor serving customers. She makes a considerable
income, the vast majority from tips, and is relatively happy with her lot. She works at
one of the “high-end” casinos that attract a wealthier clientele and she feels somewhat
superior to the “girls” who work at the “low-end” casinos. She has heard rumors that at
some of those casinos the management requires cocktail servers to sign agreements that
they will be weighed monthly. If they gain more than six pounds, they will be laid off
until they lose the weight. At least she does not have to put up with that treatment!
At 32 years old, she knows that this job will not last forever; if she keeps in shape,
she may be able to last until she hits 38 or 40. She knows a number of women who are
serving cocktails at other casinos who are well into their 40’s. But she is not sure how
much longer she has at the job because the casinos are increasingly hiring younger
women to serve cocktails. She also knows that a neighboring high-end casino replaced its
older cocktail waitresses a few years ago with “bevertainers”. The concept was that the
women would dance as they served cocktails. The casino eliminated some cocktail server
jobs and held auditions for the new servers. Those who auditioned for the job were
younger and many had aspirations to model or act. Some believed that the casino
introduced the bevertainer concept not only to rid itself of the older women who served
cocktails, but also to change the cocktail server position from union to non-union.
She isn’t sure how she feels about union representation because she works in a nonunion shop. Most of the cocktail servers in town are represented by the Culinary
17
Workers Union, but there are a few casinos that do not have union representation.

17. While the influence of labor unions is declining nationally, membership in labor unions is
increasing in Nevada. The Culinary Workers Union, which represents service employees working in
many of the Nevada casinos, experienced a 20% increase in membership in 2005, while overall union
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Although she does not see much of a difference in working conditions for cocktail servers
where the unions exist, she believes that the union might be more protective of job
security and longevity.
She knows that there are no men serving cocktails on the floors of any of the
casinos. Her view is that no man would want the job. When asked whether men should
be hired for the job, she thinks it would be impossible—what would they wear? This is a
woman’s job, and, anyway, she makes more in tips than the bartenders and bar backs
who stock the bars, who are mostly men. It is true that the casino is loud and smoky, and
that her feet ache at the end of the day. The clients are often fresh and occasionally harass
her, but in most casinos there is good security. If a client really acts up she knows she
can have him bounced, unless perhaps he is a high roller. High rollers get special
18
treatment and it is more difficult to have them evicted. She knows of a number of
women who developed hip problems from carrying the heavy trays on one side. Even she,
who is relatively healthy, has her spine adjusted regularly by a chiropractor.
One thing does bother her a little. Each casino has employees who act as hosts to
the high rollers. The hosts arrange dinner and show reservations for guests, and
generally serve as resources to the high-betting patrons. Because the vast majority of
high rollers are men, the casinos exclusively hire men to fill the role of casino host. She
might be interested in acting as a casino host because they make more money than she
does. Moreover, in some of the high roller rooms, casino hosts, rather than cocktail
waitresses, serve drinks to the high roller customers. The hosts may be cutting into her
tips, but she has no way to become a host. She understands that being a host is a man’s
job, particularly because the hosts go with the high rollers to the strip clubs.
******
Nevada casinos openly and self-consciously sell sexual appeal by limiting
cocktail serving jobs to women dressed in alluring outfits. While they do not
advertise the jobs as exclusively for women, they hire women exclusively as
19
cocktail servers and men exclusively as casino hosts. The market is wellestablished, and locals accept these hiring practices as the natural order of
things. Like our fictitious cocktail server, locals cannot imagine a man serving
cocktails. What would he possibly wear? What man would want that job?
Remarkably, while cocktail servers have challenged the high heel requirement
and the differential treatment of pregnant women who serve cocktails, it
appears that no man has ever challenged the casinos for failing to hire him as a
20
cocktail server. In fact, men do not apply for these jobs. However, men do serve

membership grew from 12.5% to 13.8% of the working population between 2004 and July 2006. See J.
Patrick Coolican, Reid Puts Nevada In ‘08 Spotlight, LAS VEGAS SUN, July 23, 2006, at 1.
18. See Ann C. McGinley, Harassing “Girls” at the Hard Rock: Masculinities in Sexualized
Environments, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming).
19. At a recent symposium at Duke Law School on “Makeup, Identity Performance &
Discrimination” (October 20, 2006), Paul Ades, the Associate General Counsel for Harrah’s
Entertainment, Inc., stated that Harrah’s does hire both men and women to serve cocktails. He also
stated that it dressed both men and women in clothing that the casino considers sexy, but he
declined to describe what the men wear.
20. A high-ranking woman in the management of a casino in Laughlin, Nevada, once told me
that she keeps a uniform for a man cocktail server in case a man applies for the job so that her
company is not accused of discrimination against men. However, no man had ever applied.
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cocktails at the pools of some casinos. One cocktail server explained that men
are permitted at the pool but not on the casino floor because the inside of the
21
casino is more “formal” and the pool is more “informal.”
Las Vegas casinos are extremely concerned about the proper “look” of their
casinos and employees. The majority of casino employees wear uniforms which
vary in style and color with the job. The concept is that a visitor can distinguish
22
one type of employee from another by his or her uniform. In jobs that are
occupied by men and women the uniforms are almost identical. For example, in
many casinos, men and women blackjack dealers wear similar attire. Even when
the uniforms are similar in jobs occupied by both men and women, the casino
23
may have different grooming and makeup codes. The casino “look” reinforces
traditional notions of the roles of men and women.
Unlike the traditional look of other casino employees, the look of the
cocktail server is, in some ways, contradictory. The idea that women are sexual
objects who serve men with a smile conforms with and runs counter to
traditional notions because it simultaneously views two separate aspects of
women that should not exist within the same woman. The cocktail waitress is
both a “good girl”—an uncomplaining servant to the man—and a “bad girl”—
24
an object of sexual gratification. The job requires women to perform two
somewhat contradictory aspects of female gender simultaneously. She performs
“good girl” submissive gendered behavior while simultaneously performing
“bad girl” sexual flirtation. The job, therefore, requires two types of gender
performance by the cocktail server. Challenging the exclusive hiring of sexy
women as cocktail servers questions whether Title VII should be manipulated to
assign women exclusively to roles of servile, sexy beings.
III. BACKGROUND: BFOQS IN TITLE VII JURISPRUDENCE
A. BFOQ Jurisprudence
Since the BFOQ defense shields an employer from liability for overt
intentional discrimination and runs contrary to the purpose of Title VII, courts
25
consistently have held that the defense is extremely narrow. By its terms, the
BFOQ defense does not absolve an employer from race- or color-based discrimination. A Las Vegas casino, therefore, would have no defense based on the
statutory text if it decided to open a Southern plantation-style casino with Black

21. Interview with former cocktail server, in Las Vegas, Nev. (May 17, 2006).
22. Interview with former wedding planner, at the MGM Grand Hotel and Casino in Las Vegas,
Nev. (June 3, 2006).
23. See Jespersen, 444 F. 3d at 1106–07.
24. For a description of the “good girl/bad girl” dichotomy, see Deborah L. Tolman & Tracy E.
Higgins, How Being a Good Girl Can be Bad for Girls, in “BAD GIRLS”/”GOOD GIRLS”: WOMEN, SEX, AND
POWER IN THE NINETIES 205 (Nan Bauer Maglin & Donna Marie Perry eds., 1996). See also Ann C.
McGinley, Harassment of Sex(y) Workers: Applying Title VII to Sexualized Industries, 18 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 65, 87–88 (2006) (describing the “good girl” and “bad girl” behavior of cocktail waitresses).
25. See, e.g., Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 201 (stating that the BFOQ defense should be applied
narrowly); Diaz, 442 F.2d at 389 (5th Cir.) (holding that female gender is not a BFOQ for a flight
attendant), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971); Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 697 F.2d 810, 815 (8th
Cir. 1983) (holding that establishing the defense presents an employer with a “heavy burden”).
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waiters. Title VII, however, does permit an employer to prove that sex, national
27
origin, or religion is reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the
employer’s business.
The Supreme Court first interpreted Title VII’s BFOQ defense in Dothard v.
28
Rawlinson. The plaintiffs, a class of women prison guards, were prohibited by
29
regulation from serving in maximum-security male prisons in Alabama. While
30
emphasizing the narrowness of the BFOQ defense, the Court agreed that being
male was a BFOQ for the job of prison guard in the exclusively male maximum31
security prisons in Alabama. The Court concluded that protecting women from
32
violence was not a valid justification for the defense, but accepted the defense
because of the “peculiarly inhospitable” conditions at the Alabama state prisons
33
which included a “jungle atmosphere” and “rampant violence.”
The Court stated that the “very womanhood” of the women prison guards
would alter their ability to do the job of maintaining security in the prison
because there was a risk that the convicted sex offenders and other inmates
34
would assault the women guards. Although the Court’s concept of women as
temptresses seems anachronistic, the Court made clear that the BFOQ was not
designed to protect women but to maintain security in the prisons.
35
In Johnson Controls, a class of plaintiffs sued its employer, a battery
manufacturer, because its fetal-protection policy excluded fertile women—but
36
not fertile men—from jobs that exposed them to lead. The fetal-protection
policy defined all women as fertile unless they had medical documentation
37
establishing their infertility. The employer argued that adhering to the policy
was a BFOQ because studies demonstrated that lead exposure could injure
38
unborn children. The Supreme Court rejected Johnson Controls’ argument,
stressing that the BFOQ defense should be applied sparingly. It noted:
The wording of the BFOQ defense contains several terms of restriction that
indicate that the exception reaches only special situations. The statute thus limits

26. For a discussion of the possibility of a common law BFOQ for race, see generally Michael J.
Frank, Justifiable Discrimination in the News and Entertainment Industries: Does Title VII Need a Race or
Color BFOQ, 35 U.S.F. L. REV. 473 (2001).
27. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), which prohibits discrimination
against persons over 40 years old due to their age, also grants a BFOQ defense to employers. 29
U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (2000).
28. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 333.
31. Id. at 334–37.
32. Id. at 335.
33. Id. at 334–35 (quoting Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 325 (M.D. Ala. 1976)). Unlike wellrun state prisons, the Alabama prisons had inadequate staff and facilities and did not segregate the
prisoners according to the dangerousness of their offenses. About ten percent of the prisoners were
convicted sex offenders who lived in the dormitories with the other inmates. Id. at 336.
34. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 334–36 (1977).
35. 499 U.S. 187 (1999).
36. Id. at 192.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 198.
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the situations in which discrimination is permissible to ‘certain instances’ where
sex discrimination is ‘reasonably necessary’ to the ‘normal operation’ of the
‘particular’ business. Each one of these terms—certain, normal, particular—
prevents the use of general subjective standards and favors an objective,
verifiable requirement. But the most telling term is ‘occupational’; this indicates
that these objective, verifiable requirements must concern job-related skills and
39
aptitudes.

The Court emphasized that the employer did not have total discretion to
define its business to fit the BFOQ defense:
Justice White defines ‘occupational’ as meaning related to a job. According to
him, any discriminatory requirement imposed by an employer is ‘job-related’
simply because the employer has chosen to make the requirement a condition of
employment. In effect, he argues that sterility may be an occupational
qualification for women because Johnson Controls has chosen to require it. This
reading of ‘occupational’ renders the word mere surplusage. ‘Qualification’ by
itself would encompass an employer’s idiosyncratic requirements. By modifying
‘qualification’ with ‘occupational,’ Congress narrowed the term to qualifications
40
that affect an employee’s ability to do the job.

Moreover, the Court repeated that Dothard v. Rawlinson upheld the defense
in order to avoid injury to the employer’s business objectives, which included
the maintenance of prison security. The presence of women, in that case, would
likely have caused a breach in security and therefore, would hinder the women’s
41
ability to do the job. No such situation existed at Johnson Controls. A woman’s
fertility had no relationship to her ability to perform the tasks required in a
battery manufacturing plant. Therefore, because fertility was not related to the
essence of the business and because it did not affect the women’s ability to
42
perform the job, it was not a BFOQ.
After Johnson Controls, an employer must prove that its BFOQ defense is
based on objective fact and that the sex or sex-differentiated job qualification
relates to the “essence” or the “central mission” of the employer’s business and
is objectively and verifiably necessary to the employee’s performance of job
43
tasks and responsibilities.
B. Privacy and BFOQs
The Supreme Court has never decided whether privacy is a proper
justification for a BFOQ, but it has suggested that privacy may support a

39. Id. at 201. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000), made clear that discrimination on the basis of one’s ability to become
pregnant or on the basis of one’s pregnancy is sex discrimination. Id. at 204–05. The Act states, the
Court explained, that pregnant women must be treated the same as other employees with regard to
their ability or inability to work. Id.
40. Id. at 201.
41. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 202.
42. Id. at 206.
43. Id. at 187.
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44

BFOQ. Some lower courts recognize a BFOQ defense where the employer
argues that exclusive hiring of men or women for a particular job protects the
45
privacy interests of patients, customers, or inmates. Kimberly Yuracko has
demonstrated that courts are more likely to find a BFOQ in order to protect the
privacy interest of the consumer than in cases in which the employer hires
46
exclusively women to use sex appeal to sell a product or service.
While some of these cases stress the employer’s economic interest in
protecting the privacy of its consumers, the more compelling cases deal with
privacy of inmates and patients who either have been victims of sexual abuse or
47
are vulnerable to sexual assault.
C. Sex, Authenticity and BFOQs
1. Selling Sex, Sex Appeal, and BFOQs
While courts are generally more lenient in finding BFOQs when the
48
employer asserts consumer privacy as a justification, courts judge an
employer’s BFOQ defense more harshly when the employer hires women or

44. In a footnote in Johnson Controls, the Court refused to reach the question of whether patient
or client privacy would ever justify a BFOQ defense in a sex discrimination case, but it implied that
the Court may possibly uphold privacy as a justification for a BFOQ using the “essence of the
business test.” Id. at 206 n.4.
45. See Norwood v. Dale Maint. Sys., Inc., 590 F. Supp. 1410, 1422 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (upholding
BFOQ to protect privacy interests of men in men’s wash rooms); Backus v. Baptist Medical Ctr., 510
F. Supp 1191, 1192–93 (E.D. Ark. 1981) (holding that hospital made out a BFOQ defense for its policy
of assigning only female nurses to the obstetrical care unit because of the need to protect patients’
dignity and privacy), vacated on other grounds, 671 F.2d 1100 (8th Cir. 1982). But see Torres v. Wis.
Dep’t of Health and Soc. Servs., 859 F.2d 1523 (7th Cir. 1988) (stating that BFOQ defense may be
possible in a women’s correctional facility that hired no men for certain positions but rejecting the
security and privacy rationales for the defense and remanding to the lower court to consider
rehabilitation as a justification for the defense); Griffin v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 654 F. Supp. 690, 703
(E.D. Mich. 1982) (rejecting the defendant prison’s BFOQ defense in a maximum security male
prison, and concluding that male inmates do not possess any protected right under the Constitution
against being viewed while naked by correction officers of the opposite sex).
46. Kimberly A. Yuracko, Private Nurses and Playboy Bunnies: Explaining Permissible Sex
Discrimination, 92 CAL. L. REV. 147, 151–53 (2004).
47. See Everson, 391 F.3d at 737 (upholding the prison’s BFOQ defense for hiring females only
for certain positions in female prisons based on the documented history of sexual abuse and assaults
of the female prisoners by male prison guards); Healey v. Southwood Psychiatric Hosp., 78 F.3d 128
(3d Cir. 1996) (upholding BFOQ defense of children’s psychiatric hospital which transferred the
female plaintiff, a child care specialist, to the night shift in order to assure there was at least one
woman on every shift because child patients are victims of sex abuse ); Jennings v. N.Y. State Office
of Mental Health, 786 F. Supp 376 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (concluding that there is a BFOQ that at least one
person working in a mental health facility as a Security Hospital Treatment Assistant be a woman to
protect the privacy and security of women patients). But cf. Torres, 859 F.2d at 1530, 1533 (7th Cir.
1988) (holding that under the circumstances particular to this case privacy of women prisoners is not
sufficient reason for BFOQ defense in hiring only women guards, but stating that business purpose
of rehabilitation may be sufficient for a BFOQ); Griffin, 654 F. Supp. at 704 (E.D. Mich. 1982)
(distinguishing Dothard and holding that it is not a BFOQ to hire only men guards in male maximum
security prison because there was no evidence of mismanagement, rampant violence, or of a junglelike atmosphere).
48. See Yuracko, supra note 46, at 151–53.
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49

men exclusively to use sex appeal to sell unrelated goods and services. In Diaz
50
v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., for example, the defendant asserted a BFOQ
defense for refusing to hire male flight attendants because customers preferred
women as flight attendants. The Fifth Circuit rejected the defense because the
primary function of an airline is safe transportation; excluding men from
51
becoming flight attendants did not further this function.
52
Likewise, in Wilson v. Southwest Airlines, Southwest Airlines offered a
BFOQ defense for limiting flight attendant and ticket agent positions to women.
Southwest argued that hiring women was necessary to its advertising campaign
53
and new sexy, young image. The court rejected the defendant’s BFOQ defense
because a man can perform the job of a flight attendant and ticket agent, the sex
appeal portion of the job was tangential to its essential duties, and the company
could not prove that it would go out of business if it hired men for those
54
positions. The court concluded that the BFOQ defense is not applicable if sex is
55
used to promote a business that is unrelated to sex. It stated, “[S]ex does not
become a BFOQ merely because an employer chooses to exploit female sexuality
56
as a marketing tool or to better ensure profitability.”
Dean Bartlett agrees with Diaz and Wilson and argues that a business
whose “essence” is selling sex may have a BFOQ defense for hiring a woman
57
into a specific job that requires female sex or sex-based characteristics. Under
this view, a strip club may employ the BFOQ defense when challenged for
hiring exclusively women as exotic dancers if the essence of its business is to
58
provide entertainment to heterosexual men, but airlines and restaurants may

49. See, e.g., Diaz, 442 F.2d at 385; Wilson, 517 F. Supp. at 292; Yuracko, supra note 46, at 196–98.
Yuracko notes that the courts draw a sharp distinction between businesses that hire women to sell
sex and businesses that use sex appeal to sell another product or service, a distinction that is
recommended by Bartlett. See Yuracko, supra note 46, at 151–53. While Professor Yuracko agrees that
customer privacy is a better justification than sexual titillation, she finds the courts’ explanation of its
reasons for its line-drawing inadequate. Yuracko posits that a preferable explanation for the courts’
recognition of a privacy BFOQ is perfectionism that recognizes privacy as a negative right. In other
words, courts do not demand that a person be private or receive privacy, but once the person claims
a privacy right, the courts will permit the consumer his or her privacy preference even if it is not
logical.
50. 442 F. 2d 385, 387–88 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971).
51. Id. at 388.
52. 517 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
53. Id. at 293.
54. Id. at 302.
55. Id. at 304.
56. Id. at 303.
57. See Bartlett, supra note 8, at 2575–76.
58. Although Kimberly Yuracko disagrees that the “essence of the business” test justifies the
results espoused by Bartlett and followed generally by the courts, Yuracko argues that courts
properly refuse to grant a BFOQ to businesses that use sex appeal to sell other services. See Yuracko,
supra note 46, at 201–02. The four possible definitions of “essence” she examines are: 1) “inherent
theory of essences”; 2) “shared meaning of essences”; 3) “employer-defined meaning of essences”;
and 4) “customer-defined theory of essences.” Id. at 161–67. Yuracko posits that the courts’ refusal to
permit employers to use sex appeal as a BFOQ to sell other services serves the policies of Title VII by
permitting women workers to flourish in environments that value their intellectual capacities and do
not judge them as sex symbols. Id. at 202. According to Yuracko, worker-focused perfectionism has
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not use the defense if they attempt to attract customers by hiring exclusively
59
women. Dean Bartlett makes this argument forcefully with reference to the
60
lawsuits against Hooters, a restaurant chain that hires only female waitresses
who wear sexually provocative clothing. She explains that employers may not
use the BFOQ defense to sexual subordination of women in order to gain a
competitive advantage:
Hooters should be required to show that the sex distinctions at issue are so
essential to its business that without them it could no longer provide the
primary product or service it intends, lawfully, to provide. Following Diaz and
Wilson, it should not be enough that consumers at Hooters enjoy—and even
demonstrate through customer surveys that they enjoy—having the option of
buying food in an environment in which sexual excitement is also provided.
What Wilson establishes is that the sexual subordination of women cannot be
used simply to gain competitive advantage. A business must show that its
primary purpose is to provide sexual stimulation rather than food, drink, or
some other service for which sex is not an essential component. This it has a
perfect right to do, although to defend its right to discriminate on the basis of
sex, a business will not be able to hide behind the legitimacy of ordinary
business purposes the public deems more ‘respectable’—flying passengers,
serving food, and so on. Once it attempts to defend its business in nonsexual
terms, the BFOQ exception is no longer available to protect sex-specific
requirements. The rule of thumb at the end of the day is simple: sex bars may
61
subordinate women, but airlines and restaurants may not.

2. Authenticity and BFOQs
The EEOC recognizes sex as a BFOQ “[w]here it is necessary for the
62
purpose of authenticity or genuineness.” To illustrate this point, the EEOC
states that an employer who hires an actor or actress may use sex in order to
63
guarantee authenticity of the production. While the authenticity exception is
limited, it conceivably offers a defense to an employer who hires entertainers

two aspects: 1) an emphasis on the individual worker’s development and treatment as a rational
actor; and 2) an understanding that women’s self-concepts are fragile. Id.
59. While most courts seem to agree with Bartlett that the BFOQ defense does not apply to
employers who use sex appeal to sell a product but should protect employers whose business sells
sex as its primary mission, Bartlett’s prediction that the sex clubs and other businesses that sell sex
primarily would be marginalized by the law, see Bartlett, supra note 8, at 2577–78, seems not to have
come true. Today, there are more sex clubs than in the past and there is a market for more highpriced, “high-class” establishments. Apart from Las Vegas, strip clubs are thriving across the
country. DANIELLE EGAN, DANCING FOR DOLLARS AND PAYING FOR LOVE: THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN EXOTIC DANCERS AND THEIR REGULARS 9, 11–12 (2006).
60. Hooters is a restaurant chain that advertises the sex appeal of its waitresses who dress in
tight midriff-baring shirts and shorts. Jeannie Sclafani Rhee, Redressing for Success: The Liability of
Hooters Restaurant for Customer Harassment of Waitresses, 20 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 163, 191 n.134 (1997).
The shirts, which are worn very tight, exhibit two large eyes of an owl over the breasts. Id. at 163 n.4.
“Hooter” is also a slang term for breast. Id. at 295; Joshua Burstein, Testing the Strength of Title VII
Sexual Harassment Protection: Can It Support a Hostile Work Environment Claim Brought By a Nude
Dancer?, 24 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 271, 295 (1998).
61. Bartlett, supra note 8, at 2578–79.
62. 29 C.F.R. § 1604(a)(2) (2003) (alteration added).
63. Id.
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other than actors if the entertainment is sex-specific. If the entertainment is
sexual in nature, but selling sex is not the central core of the employer’s
business, the BFOQ defense might apply.
For example, the New York Human Rights Appeal Board found that a
BFOQ defense applied to the hiring of Playboy bunnies to work in the Playboy
64
Club. The Commissioner of the New York State Division of Human Rights
65
came to the same conclusion. Although it is unclear whether the Board
permitted the exclusive hiring of women as Playboy bunnies because the
“essence” of the business of the Playboy Club was to sell sex or in order to
promote authenticity, the Playboy Club seems to fall in between the example of
a strip club whose central mission is to sell sexual entertainment and a theatrical
production that hires women to act in the roles of women.
Notwithstanding the decision of the New York Human Rights Appeal
Board and the later decision by the Commissioner, a serious argument exists
that being a woman is not a BFOQ for the job of Playboy Club bunny. Under the
Johnson Controls test, using women as “bunnies” may relate to the essence of the
business of the Playboy Club if the essence is defined as offering a “club”
environment that caters to heterosexual men by emphasizing female sexuality.
The essence of the business can be defined more broadly, however, to include
serving food and drinks and an opportunity for a primarily male clientele to
relax and gamble, rather than selling female sexuality.
Even if the essence is to sell female sexuality, the Playboy Club may have
difficulty proving the second part of the Johnson Controls test: that being a
woman is objectively and verifiably necessary to the performance of the job
tasks and responsibilities of the Playboy bunny. If the tasks of a Playboy bunny
include serving food and drinks to customers, there is no question that both men
and women are capable of performing these job requirements. A good argument
can be made that the Playboy Club uses sex appeal to sell other unrelated
products, just as Pan Am and Southwest Airlines attempted to do when it hired
only women as flight attendants. The Playboy bunny is not selling sex in the
same way that a dancer in an exotic dance club is. Rather, the Playboy Club uses
her sex appeal to sell other products.
A counterargument would assert that Playboy bunnies are at the very core
of the Playboy Club. If the Playboy Club were forced to hire men into these jobs,
the men could not perform as bunnies because they lack the feminine sex appeal
which is central to the mission of the Playboy Club. Thus, the argument would
be threefold: 1) rather than using sex appeal to serve other products, sex appeal
is central to the product and the identity of the Playboy Club; 2) the clientele
would likely desert the Playboy Club without the female bunnies; and 3) unlike

64. See Wilson, 517 F. Supp. at 301 (citing St. Cross v. Playboy Club, Appeal No. 773, Case No.
CFS 22618-70 (N.Y. Human Rights Appeals Bd., 1971) (dicta); Weber v. Playboy Club, Appeal No.
774, Case No. DFS 22619-70 (N.Y. Human Rights Appeals Bd., 1971) (dicta)); Playboy Club Int’l, Inc.
v. Hotel & Rest. Employees & Bartenders Int’l Union, 321 F. Supp. 704, 704 (S.D.N.Y. 1971)
(assuming the legality of the appearance rules for Playboy bunnies).
65. Aromi v. Playboy Club, Inc. et. al., Case No. X-E-ADMS-42884-761 (N.Y. State Div. Human
Rights Aug. 1, 1985) (concluding that having the “bunny image” is a BFOQ and stating that it is
bound by the St. Cross and Weber cases), available at http://njlegallib.rutgers.edu/misc/aromi.pdf, at
2.
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Pan Am and Southwest Airlines, the focus of the Playboy Club is entertainment.
In order to accomplish the goal of entertaining its clientele, the Playboy Club
must have the freedom to entertain in a manner desired by its male clientele.
This position incorporates both the arguments that being a woman is
related to the “essence” of the business and that authenticity requires that
women be bunnies. The Playboy Club may argue that a Playboy bunny has a
specific feminine identity that customers associate with the organization. If the
club were to permit men to serve as bunnies, the image and identity of the
Playboy bunny would be altered or destroyed. Because the image and identity
are closely linked to the hedonistic pleasures of heterosexual men, women by
their very womanhood are exclusively able to serve as Playboy bunnies. If men
were hired into the positions as Playboy bunnies, the authentic or genuine
identity of the Playboy Club would be altered.
IV. APPLYING THE BFOQ DEFENSE TO COCKTAIL SERVERS:
LAW AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The privacy, sex appeal, and authenticity cases shed light on the analysis
that courts should employ in determining whether casinos have a BFOQ defense
to Title VII for hiring exclusively women as cocktail servers. From the privacy
cases, the casinos are likely to borrow the argument that they will lose profits if
they do not offer sexy women in the role of cocktail waitress. Although this
argument is sometimes successful in combination with an asserted privacy
interest of the customer, alone it would be difficult to make. If, however, this
argument were combined with a claim that selling sexy entertainment is the
“essence” of the business or that authenticity requires a finding of a BFOQ, it
may have some force.
A second argument the casinos will probably make relates to the “essence
of the business.” The casinos may argue that the Pan Am and Southwest Airlines
cases are distinguishable because the essence of the business of an airline is the
safe transport of passengers. Unlike airlines and other companies that sell a
service or product unrelated to sex appeal, casinos provide young, attractive
cocktail servers to entertain heterosexual men. The casino owners will analogize
their businesses to that of the Playboy Clubs arguing that, like the Playboy
bunnies, casino cocktail servers offer entertainment and feminine appeal which
is objectively necessary to perform the job responsibilities of taking care of the
male customers.
Finally, this argument may combine with the courts’ recognition that a
need for authenticity can create a successful BFOQ defense. The casinos are
likely to argue that the cocktail servers are similar to actresses who play the role
of sexy handmaidens who serve the patrons as they gamble. Moreover, they
probably will argue that cocktail servers must meet certain criteria in order to
please the customer. The uniforms and dress codes required of cocktail servers
reinforce the argument that being a woman with a certain personality and
appearance is a BFOQ for the job of cocktail server. These tight-fitting uniforms
emphasize the cocktail servers’ youth and sexuality and confirm that the
women’s role is to serve the male gambler. Men who come to the casinos step
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into a bubble of fantasy. Cocktail waitresses, dressed in sexy uniforms, work to
66
fulfill the fantasy.
The casinos’ arguments may or may not prevail. In response, a good
argument exists that, unlike exotic dancers in a gentlemen’s club, a cocktail
server does not engage in sexual repartee or contact with the patrons. The
cocktail servers’ job is to serve male and female patrons in an efficient and
friendly manner. If this definition of job responsibilities prevails, casinos may
have difficulty convincing a judge that womanhood is objectively and verifiably
necessary to perform the job tasks. In light of this problem, the casinos will
probably attempt to define the job in sexual terms or to describe the essence of
the business as entertainment. They are likely to maintain that sexy women
cocktail servers are part of the entertainment offered to casino clientele.
Under the tests established in Johnson Controls, Diaz, and Southwest Airlines,
if the essence of the casino business is defined as providing gaming
opportunities to customers, limiting cocktail server positions to sexy young
women appears unrelated to this mission. Moreover, even if the central mission
is defined more broadly as “sexy entertainment,” a definition that would not
apply to most casinos unless the casino limits the casino floors to adults, the
argument that only women can perform the tasks of the job is weak.
While it is conceivable that a particular casino could build its business
around a sexual image and that all casino workers would necessarily further the
sexy image, that casino does not exist. Most casinos require a combination of
sexy and conservative dress and grooming of its employees. For employees
other than cocktail servers, casinos impose uniform dress and grooming
requirements that are rather conservative. Conservative hairstyles, nail polish
67
and hair color are required. Men are forbidden from wearing colored nail
68
polish. And, even though the casinos require that cocktail waitresses wear
skimpy sexy uniforms, some of the grooming requirements of the cocktail
waitresses are quite conservative. For example, the casino regulates the color of
69
the hair and nail polish to present a more conservative uniform image.
Perhaps a more important question is how the courts should interpret the
law—i.e., whether application of a BFOQ defense furthers Title VII’s policies.
This discussion is complex because the purposes and policies underlying Title
VII point in different directions depending on what values we consider most
precious. Arguments against recognizing the BFOQ focus on the dignitary
interests of women as a group, including: (1) the subordination of individual
women who serve as cocktail waitresses as well as the subordination of women
as a group; (2) the possibility that other better jobs would open up to women

66. It is interesting that other casino workers have dress and appearance codes that require the
workers to wear conservative clothing, hairstyles and makeup. In a sense the casino cocktail
waitress, although she wears what many would consider a racy costume, is considered “classy” in
Las Vegas, perhaps a throwback to the old concept of showgirls. See, e.g., Dress, Appearance, and
Grooming Codes of the following casinos in Las Vegas: Aladdin, Paris/Bally’s, Binion’s, Boyd
Gaming, Frontier, MGM Grand, Monte Carlo, Palms, Station Casinos, Venetian (on file with author).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Interviews with former cocktail servers, in Las Vegas, Nev. (May 26 and 27, 2005; May 17,
2006); interview with bar back, in Las Vegas, Nev. (June 16, 2006).
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cocktail waitresses if the BFOQ does not exist; and (3) the rights of individual
men who would be hired to serve cocktails if they were permitted to do so.
Arguments in favor of recognizing a BFOQ would emphasize: (1) the individual
woman’s right to sell her sex appeal for economic gain; (2) the woman and her
family’s economic interests; and (3) the rights of casino owners to define their
businesses.
A. Interests Opposing a BFOQ Defense
Professor Yuracko approves of the courts’ reluctance to find sex as a BFOQ
70
in cases such as Pan Am and Southwest Airlines. Although she believes that the
“essence of the business” test does not explain the line drawing between
businesses that sell sex appeal and businesses that sell sex, she believes that the
71
courts’ jurisprudence reflects a type of perfectionism. She argues that
recognizing a BFOQ defense to hire women as sexual titillation may impede the
72
progress of women as a group in achieving their full intellectual potential.
Citing a study that demonstrates that dressing women in sexy apparel impairs
their intellectual functioning, Yuracko opines that women will flourish if
73
employers emphasize intellectual abilities rather than sexual attraction.
Similarly, Dean Bartlett argues for limiting the BFOQ defense to very
narrow circumstances. She believes that by being viewed as sex symbols women
are subordinated and that the law should not approve of the subordination by
permitting businesses to sell their products through the use of female sex
74
appeal. Consequently, she would limit the BFOQ defense to legal businesses
75
that directly sell sex. According to these views, a decision refusing to extend
the BFOQ defense to cover the exclusive hiring of women in casinos would
reduce the stigmatization of women as sex symbols and encourage women to
flourish through emphasis of their intellectual capacities.
Defining the cocktail server job as sexualized subordinates women as a
group. Women in general would have greater dignity if courts decided not to
sanction the casinos’ subjugation of women through the exclusive hiring of sexy
women as cocktail waitresses. Sanctioning the BFOQ defense would not only
subordinate women cocktail servers as a group, but may also lead to more
76
aggressive use of the defense. What would prevent employers from defining
their product or services as particularly feminine or masculine? A law firm
could argue that it hires only men who are aggressive litigators because the
clients prefer male lawyers. Schools could hire only women as teachers because
women are arguably more child-oriented or because the parents prefer female
teachers. The law should not reinforce sexual subjugation of women or rely on
stereotyping to determine which jobs are feminine and masculine.

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

See Yuracko, supra note 46, at 212–13.
Id. at 172–79.
Id. at 210.
Id. at 208–09, 210–12.
See Bartlett, supra note 8, at 2576.
Id. at 2575.
See, e.g., Yuracko, supra note 46, at 201 for an articulation of this argument.
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B. Interests Favoring a BFOQ Defense
On the other hand, some women view commodification as a means to an
77
end. These women may prefer the power to decide to sell their sexuality as a
commodity. There is increasing commodification of personal services and many
78
feminists argue that commodification is not always a bad thing. Las Vegas
casinos offer good jobs to women cocktail waitresses. Many of these women use
these jobs to raise families or to put themselves through university or graduate
school. These jobs, which have flexible hours and are well-paid, can give women
the freedom to pursue opportunities that allow them to develop their
79
intellectual abilities and flourish.
Moreover, within certain limits imposed by Title VII, business owners have
the right to define their own businesses. Casinos use the cocktail servers as “eye
candy” to attract visitors to the casino and to keep patrons happy and gambling.
The casinos’ exclusive hiring of women as cocktail servers, and the dressing of
women cocktail servers in sexy attire, distinguishes the Nevada casinos from
other gaming establishments. In Nevada, for instance, it is possible to play slot
machines in grocery stores that do not have sexy women serving cocktails. In
fact, the women—and it usually is women—who work in the supermarkets in
Las Vegas in the slot machine section are almost always senior citizens.
Moreover, in Nevada, gaming in the form of video poker exists in a number of
bar/restaurant establishments that do not limit their cocktail servers to young
women dressed in skimpy outfits. Outside of Nevada, casinos operated by
Indian tribes or on riverboats in the Mississippi have a different atmosphere.
Consequently, Nevada casino owners have a legitimate argument that their
establishments are unique: they offer gaming in a “classier,” more sexualized
environment.
C. Choosing Which Set of Interests to Protect
The above arguments raise legitimate questions concerning which
interpretation of the BFOQ defense would better further the policies of Title VII.
Because the casinos would have difficulty proving that being a sexy woman is a
BFOQ under the test articulated in Johnson Controls and because there are strong
policy arguments in favor of not expanding the use of the BFOQ in this
situation, casinos should not be able to justify a BFOQ defense. Perhaps the best
reason for refusing to recognize a BFOQ defense is that job segregation leads to

77. “Commodification” includes the selling of one’s sex or sex appeal for money. See generally
RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION (Martha M. Ertman & Joan C. Williams, eds., 2005).
78. See, e.g., Martha C. Nussbaum, Taking Money for Bodily Services, in RETHINKING
COMMODIFICATION, supra note 77, at 243 (arguing that many professionals sell their services for
money); Ann Lucas, The Currency of Sex: Prostitution, Law and Commodification, in RETHINKING
COMMODIFICATION, supra note 77, at 255 (arguing that like wisdom sold by an expert, sex is not used
up or diminished by sales). See also McGinley, supra note 24, at 95 n.188.
79. A number of law students at Boyd School of Law work their way through school as cocktail
servers or have been cocktail servers in the past. Interviews of law students who were former
cocktail waitresses or who worked as waitresses during law school, in Las Vegas, Nev. (May 26 and
27, 2005) (on file with the author).
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80

job stratification, lower salaries, and sexual harassment of women. While
women serve as cocktail servers, men fill the jobs of casino hosts. The host jobs,
which are highly coveted, are better paid and more respected than the jobs of
81
cocktail server. A decision not to permit the BFOQ defense for cocktail server
positions may create jobs for men in those positions and simultaneously open
up jobs for women as casino hosts. Given the harms of job segregation, deciding
that womanhood is not a BFOQ for the job of cocktail server does little relative
harm to casino employers. While it imposes some limits on the casino, it does
not significantly intrude upon the owner’s ability to direct his or her business.
The casino’s primary business is gaming, not sexual entertainment. There is no
evidence that the casino business would fail if the cocktail servers were both
men and women.
More importantly, the real harm to women cocktail servers does not
necessarily result from the sexualization of women on the job. The injury results
from the different roles assigned to men and women, both to employees and
customers. The men customers play the role of sexual aggressors while the
women cocktail servers play the role of sexual beings whose purpose is to serve
the men. This stereotyping reinforces the traditional notion of the separate
spheres of men and women—men as rational beings who still have the authority
to engage in sexual predation and women as nothing other than emotionally
82
driven, sexual objects. In the traditional workplace, even though male sexuality
83
existed, it was invisible because it was the norm. Many jobs held by women
84
stress physical attractiveness. When a job has a sexual component, people
85
assume that there are few other qualifications needed for the job. While
women’s jobs often have a sexual component, men are not viewed as inherently
86
sexual at work. A workplace that intentionally sexualizes men would challenge
the traditional notion that women are sexual objects and men are rational beings
who are driven to express their sexual urges because of women’s behavior. If
such a workplace existed, it would jar the senses and clarify the aspect of
performance involved in this sexualization. Since the job of cocktail server
requires submissiveness and servility, having men serve cocktails would
demonstrate that men can also play the role of submissive servant, a
87
contradiction to ordinary gender roles.

80. See Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L. J. 2061, 2066, 2140 (2003)
(demonstrating that workers are more likely to be harassed where job segregation occurs).
81. Interview of former cocktail server, in Las Vegas, Nev. (May 17, 2006) (on file with the
author).
82. See Christine L. Williams & Dana M. Britton, Sexuality and Work, in INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL
PROBLEMS 1, 3 (Craig Calhoun & George Ritzer eds., McGraw-Hill Primis 1995) (explaining that Max
Weber assigned men to the public sphere, which includes work and organizations and women to the
private sphere, which includes family and sexuality).
83. Id. at 8.
84. Id.
85. Id. (describing research by sociologist Barbara Gutek).
86. Id.
87. Casinos hiring men as cocktail servers will have to be extremely careful that they do not
disproportionately hire men of color. Such a hiring pattern could lead to pernicious results—
promotion of the idea that women and men of color need to be submissive to white men.
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Casino operators should be given two choices: (1) de-sexualize the job of
cocktail server and hire both men and women or (2) keep the sexual component
of the job, hire both men and women, and dress them in equally sexy outfits. If
both men and women are treated as sexual beings, invisible male sexuality will
become more visible and the jobs will likely subjugate women less. Customers
will view both men and women through the sexual lens. This treatment will
offer men jobs as sexy workers and will challenge the assumption that it is a
woman’s role alone to serve as a sexual object. A decision refusing the BFOQ
defense while simultaneously permitting employers to dress men and women
cocktail servers in sexually provocative clothing reaches the proper balance
between the rights of both men and women and the interests of employers.
V. COCKTAIL SERVER’S DRESS AND GROOMING REQUIREMENTS AFTER JESPERSEN
When faced with a Title VII challenge to dress or appearance codes that
differentiate between men and women, courts employ a number of different
tests, but no court has held that differences in dress codes for men and women
constitute facial discrimination under Title VII. A few courts conclude that,
because dress and appearance codes apply to mutable characteristics within the
88
employee’s control, the codes are permissible. Other courts hold that dress
codes make such a minimal incursion into a person’s rights that they are
89
permissible if reasonable. The majority of courts permit sex-differentiated dress
90
and appearance codes if the burdens on women and men are relatively equal;

88. See, e.g., Willingham v. Macon Tele. Publ’g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1092 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding
that Title VII did not prohibit discrimination based on mutable characteristics); Baker v. Cal. Land
Title Co., 507 F.2d 895, 897 (9th Cir. 1974) (regulating men’s hair length did not violate Title VII
because it was not an immutable characteristic). The trial court in Jespersen adopted the mutable
characteristic argument as an alternative holding. See Jespersen, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 1192.
89. See, e.g., Wiseley v. Harrah’s Entm’t Inc., 94 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 402 (D.N.J. 2004)
(concluding that grooming policies fall outside of the purview of Title VII).
90. While most courts use the equal burdens test, Bartlett argues that courts’ attempts to weigh
the burdens have led to poor results. Bartlett argues that it is impossible to disregard and transcend
community norms, see Bartlett, supra note 8, at 2568, and she proposes that courts use community
norms in a more self-conscious way to determine which norms impose burdens “that disadvantage
members of one sex in relation to the other,” id. at 2569. She proposes that courts require employers
using dress codes that confer a disadvantage on one group to justify the codes by proving that they
are a BFOQ. Id. at 2572. In this case, where there are both men and women in the job, the BFOQ
defense would require that the dress or appearance code be necessary to the essence of the
employer’s business. Id. at 2578. According to Bartlett, once the BFOQ defense is applicable, the
community norms “constitute the context within which the employer must establish whether its
discriminatory rule is necessary to its essential business purpose.” Id. at 2573. Thus, a BFOQ defense
would not justify the exclusive hiring of women (or sexy women) as stewardesses or waitresses in
order to attract men customers because the primary business of an airline or restaurant is not to sell
sex, but to transport passengers or feed customers. Id. at 2573–75. In contrast, in the businesses
whose primary purpose is to offer sex as a commodity for sale the employer could prevail by posing
the BFOQ defense. Id. at 2576–77. Bartlett reasons that, although these workplaces subordinate
women as sexual objects, the combination of the law’s pressure in narrowing the BFOQ defense and
community norms that impose limits on the types of businesses that employers are willing to defend
would marginalize businesses that sell female sex. See id. at 2577–78. The underlying premise of
Bartlett’s recommendation is that strip clubs subordinate women dancers, as would other employers
if they were permitted to require sex appeal for jobs that sell unrelated services and goods. Since
Bartlett’s article, however, there has emerged feminist scholarship that would refute this premise.
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however, if the burdens on one sex outweigh those on another sex, courts find
91
that the dress or appearance code violates Title VII.
92
Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co.,
added an interesting twist to the
jurisprudence. Darlene Jespersen performed successfully as a bartender at
93
Harrah’s Casino in Reno, Nevada, for almost twenty-one years. She had a loyal
94
following of regular customers who bought drinks at her bar. When Harrah’s
encouraged its female bartenders to wear makeup during the 1980s and 1990s,
Jespersen found that wearing makeup made her feel “sick, degraded, exposed
and violated;” she felt “‘dolled up,’” like a sex object, stripped of her dignity,
95
and less effective at work.
In February 2000, the defendant instituted the “‘Beverage Department
96
Image Transformation’” program. The purpose was to create a “‘brand
97
standard of excellence.’” The “Personal Best” program, as Harrah’s described
it, included general appearance standards applicable to all employees and
98
particular sex-specific appearance standards. The standards required that

See KATHERINE FRANK, G-STRINGS, AND SYMPATHY: STRIP CLUB REGULARS AND MALE DESIRE (2002);
DANIELLE EGAN, DANCING FOR DOLLARS AND PAYING FOR LOVE: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EXOTIC
DANCERS AND THEIR REGULARS (2006) (arguing that it is empowering, not subordinating, for women
to dance in strip clubs).
91. See, e.g., Frank v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845, 855 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that it is
disparate treatment to require women to keep their maximum weight to those prescribed on weight
table for women of medium build while requiring men to maintain a maximum weight on a weight
table for men of large build).
92. 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
93. Jespersen, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 1190 (D. Nev. 2002), aff’d, 392 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2004), reh’g en
banc granted, 409 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2005), vacated, 409 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2005), aff’d, 444 F.3d 1104
(9th Cir. 2005).
94. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 392 F.3d 1076, 1077 (9th Cir. 2004 ), reh’g en banc granted,
409 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir., 2005), and vacated, 409 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2005).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. The standards state:
All Beverage Service Personnel, in addition to being friendly, polite, courteous and
responsive to our customer’s needs, must possess the ability to physically perform the
essential factors of the job as set forth in the standard job descriptions. They must be well
groomed, appealing to the eye, be firm and body toned, and be comfortable with
maintaining this look while wearing the specified uniform. Additional factors to be
considered include, but are not limited to, hair styles, overall body contour, and degree of
comfort the employee projects while wearing the uniform.
***
Beverage Bartenders and Barbacks will adhere to these additional guidelines:

• Overall Guidelines (applied equally to male/ female):
o
o
o

Appearance: Must maintain Personal Best image portrayed at time of hire.
Jewelry, if issued, must be worn. Otherwise, tasteful and simple jewelry is permitted;
no large chokers, chains or bracelets.
No faddish hairstyles or unnatural colors are permitted.

• Males:
o
o

Hair must not extend below top of shirt collar. Ponytails are prohibited.
Hands and fingernails must be clean and nails neatly trimmed at all times. No
colored polish is permitted.
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99

women’s hair be styled, teased, or curled, and that men’s hair be short. This
standard forbade men from wearing makeup and colored nail polish, but did
100
not initially require women to wear makeup. Eventually, Harrah’s amended
101
the standard to require women to wear makeup.
102
Harrah’s also instituted “Personal Best” training for its employees. Once
the professional trainers completed the training, they photographed each
employee and placed the photos into the employees’ files. Supervisory
employees used these photographs to judge whether each employee complied
103
with the standards every day. Jespersen refused to wear makeup and Harrah’s
104
fired her. She sued, alleging sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the
105
1964 Civil Rights Act. The federal district court granted Harrah’s motion for
106
summary judgment. The court concluded that the policy did not impose
107
greater burdens on women than on men; that “the makeup requirement
involves a mutable characteristic, which does not infringe on equal employment
108
opportunities due to one’s sex”; and, finally, that the U.S. Supreme Court’s
decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, which held that discrimination because
109
of a woman’s failure to conform to sex stereotypes is prohibited by Title VII,
does not support a cause of action for discriminatory dress and appearance
110
codes.
The court did not reach the question of whether the makeup
111
requirement was a BFOQ.

•

o
Eye and facial makeup is not permitted.
o
Shoes will be solid black leather or leather type with rubber (non skid) soles.
Females:
o
Hair must be teased, curled, or styled every day you work. Hair must be worn down
at all times, no exceptions.
o
Stockings are to be of nude or natural color consistent with employee’s skin tone. No
runs.
o
Nail polish can be clear, white, pink or red color only. No exotic nail art or length.
o
Shoes will be solid black leather or leather type with rubber (non skid) soles.
o
Make up (face powder, blush and mascara) must be worn and applied neatly in
complimentary [sic] colors. Lip color must be worn at all times. (emphasis added).

Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1107 (emphasis added by court).
99. Id.
100. Jespersen, 392 F.3d at 1077–78 (9th Cir. 2004).
101. Id. at 1078, n.2. The amended policy stated: “make up (foundation/concealer and/or face
powder, as well as blush and mascara) must be worn and applied neatly in complimentary colors,”
and that “lip color must be worn at all times.” Id.
102. Id. at 1078.
103. Id.
104. Jespersen, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 1190.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1196.
107. Id. at 1193.
108. Id.
109. 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (holding that sex stereotyping is evidence of illegal sex discrimination).
110. Jespersen, 280 F. Supp. 2d. at 1193.
111. Id. at 1194.
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On appeal, a three judge panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower
112
court’s decision with one dissent. In a rehearing en banc, the Ninth Circuit
113
once again affirmed, over two vigorous dissents by Judges Pregerson and
114
Kozinski. The majority agreed that the proper test in a dress and appearance
policy case is whether the policy imposes unequal burdens on men and women.
According to the majority, Jespersen’s testimony that she found the makeup
requirement burdensome was merely her subjective response to the policy and
115
did not establish that the policy’s burdens were unequal. The majority looked
at the entire appearance standard and concluded that there was insufficient
evidence in the record to prove a greater burden on women. The court left open
the possibility that, in a future case, a plaintiff could prove that the policy
116
imposed unequal burdens on women and men.
Perhaps more important to the dress codes of cocktail servers in Nevada
casinos, the court held that future plaintiffs may potentially employ the Price
Waterhouse sex stereotyping theory to attack a dress code that intentionally
117
stereotypes a person because of sex. The majority concluded, however, that
Harrah’s dress code did not stereotype women because of their sex and that
there was no evidence that the dress code was motivated by an interest in
118
treating women as sex objects. In reaching this conclusion, the majority noted
that the makeup requirement did not objectively interfere with a woman’s
119
ability to perform the job as bartender. The court also noted that the dress code
120
required of men and women bartenders was mostly unisex. The uniform
included non-skid black shoes, and it fully covered the bodies of both men and
women; there was no intention to make the women’s uniform sexually

112. Jespersen, 392 F.3d at 1076. The two judge majority concluded that the test in the Ninth
Circuit is the “unequal burdens” test. It held that the proper measure was the entire appearance
standard as applicable to men and women rather than the makeup requirement alone and noted that
the plaintiff had not placed into the record any evidence demonstrating that there was a heavier
burden imposed on women than on men employees. Id. at 1081. In contravention of the district court
judge’s decision, the two judge majority noted that even if there is a mutable characteristic and there
is an unequal burden placed on women than on men, the employer would be required to prove that
the sex-differentiated requirement was a BFOQ. Id. at 1080. The majority also declined to apply Price
Waterhouse to a dress code case. Id. at 1082–83. The dissent argued that the plaintiff presented a
question of material fact as to whether the employer’s appearance standards placed a heavier
burden on women. Id. at 1085 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The dissent pointed out that the plaintiff
presented a question of material fact under the Price Waterhouse sex stereotyping doctrine because
makeup historically has been used as a tool of subordination of women. Id. at 1083–84. The
dissenting judge disputed the approach taken by the majority. In determining whether unequal
burdens existed, the dissent would have compared the requirement that women wear makeup
against the prohibition against men’s wearing of makeup, rather than considering the entire
appearance code and its overall burdens on men and women respectively. Id. at 1085–86.
113. 444 F.3d 1104, 1113 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
114. Of the eleven judges voting, seven were in the majority and four dissented. Id. at 1104.
115. See id. at 1110–11.
116. See id.
117. Id. at 1113.
118. Id. at 1112.
119. Id. at 1112.
120. Id.
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121

provocative. Moreover, this was not a case of sexual harassment because of the
122
plaintiff’s failure to conform to feminine norms of dress or behavior.
According to the court, Jespersen’s evidence, which showed her subjective
revulsion to the makeup requirement, did not establish that Harrah’s intended
123
to sex stereotype women in general by imposing the makeup requirement.
Thus, the definition and evolution of the law of sex stereotyping and dress and
124
appearance codes are left open to future lawsuits.
After Jespersen’s clarification that a cause of action under Price Waterhouse
may exist if employers impose dress or appearance codes intentionally to
stereotype employees because of their sex, an employer who hires exclusively
men or women and dresses them in sexy, sex-stereotyping uniforms will likely
have to prove that the dress code is a BFOQ in order to escape liability under
Title VII. There can be little debate that current dress and appearance codes for
cocktail servers intentionally stereotype women employees because of their sex.
The uniforms are low cut, skimpy, and very sexy. This article has argued that
being a sexy woman should not be a BFOQ for a cocktail server job in a Las
Vegas casino or similar establishment. Casino employers, therefore, must give
equal employment opportunities to men and women applying for jobs as
cocktail servers. Moreover, if the casinos have a reputation of hiring only
women to fill these jobs, they are potentially liable for a failure to hire men even
125
if they receive few or no applications from men. A perception of gender bias
and sexualization of women may in fact have created a disincentive for men to
apply for the positions. Casinos, therefore, should make affirmative efforts to
recruit and hire men as cocktail servers to countermand the persistent, historical
126
practice of hiring only women to serve cocktails.

121. Id. The court distinguished E.E.O.C. v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599, 610–11 (S.D.N.Y.
1981) (holding a cause of action existed under Title VII where the employer forced the female lobby
attendant to wear a sexually provocative outfit that subjected her to customer harassment).
122. Id. at 1113. The court distinguished both Rene v. MGM Grant Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1063–
64 (9th Cir. 2002) (concluding that a cause of action under Title VII existed where a man is sexually
harassed because he does not conform to the sexual stereotypes of masculinity), and Nichols v. Azteca
Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 874–75 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that a cause of action under Price
Waterhouse existed because the plaintiff, a male waiter, was harassed for his feminine mannerisms).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 386–87 (1986) (sanctioning use of multiple regression
analysis to prove employment discrimination); Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,
339–40 n.20 (1977) (stating statistics can be used to prove a pattern and practice of discrimination).
Compare Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308–09 (1977) (recommending courts
use a comparison between the racial composition of persons holding jobs in the defendant’s
workforce with the racial composition of the qualified individuals in the relevant labor market), with
EEOC v. Joe’s Stone Crab, Inc., 220 F.3d 1263, 1279–80 (11th Cir. 2000) (assuming it was proper for
the lower court to compare the number of women in the job with those in the labor pool rather than
with those who applied for the jobs because there was evidence that women did not apply for the
jobs as a result of the history of discrimination).
126. Efforts to hire men into jobs that are exclusively held by women are permissible under Title
VII so long as sex is only one factor considered in the decision to hire a man cocktail server. See
Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 641–42 (1987) (upholding a voluntary affirmative action
plan that took sex as one of several factors into account in evaluating qualified applicants for the
job).
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Once the casinos hire men to serve cocktails, Jespersen raises the additional
question of what dress codes and appearance standards would be permissible
for cocktail servers. For example, may casinos impose sex-specific dress codes
on men and women cocktail servers that stereotype them because of sex?
Jespersen is subject to multiple interpretations, and the court has left open the
possibility that future cases will define the law of dress and appearance codes
127
and sex stereotyping.
First, Jespersen may preclude all dress and appearance codes that sexually
stereotype men or women—or both—in a sexually provocative manner. If
Jespersen is interpreted this way, casinos would violate Title VII either by
imposing different sex-specific sexually provocative uniforms on men and
women, or by imposing the same sexually provocative uniform, on both men
and women. In other words, Jespersen could stand for the proposition that
requiring sexy dressing of employees is prohibited unless the employer
establishes a BFOQ. In response to dissenting Judge Pregerson’s criticism that
the unequal burden test permits sex stereotyping of both sexes, the majority
implies that even if applied equally, dress codes that sex stereotype both sexes
128
may not be permissible under Price Waterhouse. This interpretation would
likely apply to industries other than entertainment and to jobs that do not
require the employee to engage in a performance. Thus, a law firm would not be
permitted to require both its male and female associates to dress in sexy garb. If
this interpretation applied to casinos and similar establishments, it would also
eliminate costumes that are sexually provocative from the casino floors. Like the
bartenders in Jespersen, cocktail servers would dress in unisex uniforms except
for certain grooming standards that do not objectively interfere with employees’
ability to work. While this result would eliminate the obvious sexual
subrogation of women in casino dress codes, it would continue to reinforce
established cultural norms concerning what grooming standards “objectively”
impede an individual’s ability to work. Thus, while the interpretation eliminates
the sexualizing of women as a class, it does not protect the autonomy of
129
individuals who find the imposition of cultural norms oppressive.
Moreover, casino owners would find this requirement a drab and colorless
imposition on the “bubble of fantasy” that they are attempting to create. Las
Vegas casinos would argue that they exist because human beings need an escape
from the rigid rules imposed on them in their “real” lives. Furthermore, at least
some women cocktail servers welcome the opportunity to wear the fleshexposing uniforms because they can earn substantially more in tips. There is, no
doubt, an element of performance in the job of casino cocktail waitress that is
lacking in the job of waitress in a greasy spoon restaurant.
A second possible interpretation of Jespersen is that it forbids the use of
gender-bending dress and appearance codes. In other words, because Harrah’s
makeup requirement is consistent with cultural norms and reinforces expected
gendered grooming, it will not objectively inhibit a woman or a man’s ability to

127. 444 F.3d at 1112.
128. Id.
129. See generally Catherine L. Fisk, supra note 15, for a detailed discussion of employee
autonomy and dress codes.
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do the job. A code that requires short cropped hair on women and curled hair
and makeup on men, however, may objectively inhibit the employee’s ability to
do the job and is therefore illegal. While Las Vegas sees itself as very free
sexually, it actually projects a free heterosexual image, by suppressing a
130
homosexual image.
It flaunts its heterosexual identification through a
commodified, sexualized view of women, but avoids the reality of
131
homosexuality. At least insofar as the casinos are concerned, “desire Las Vegas
132
style” means heterosexual men’s desire for women. A reading of Jespersen that
prohibits gender-bending dress codes would reinforce these one-sided norms,
which emphasize sexy young women as objects of heterosexual desire. A
gender-bending dress code in Las Vegas may actually do more to challenge
traditional notions of a woman as a sex object than unisex dressing.
Another interpretation of Jespersen would prohibit dress and grooming
codes that are sufficiently sexually provocative to create an opportunity for
customers to harass employees because of sex. This interpretation may also be
too restrictive. While casinos should be liable for sexual harassment of cocktail
133
servers by customers that casinos negligently permit to occur, casinos should
be permitted to define the cocktail server’s job as part-performance even though
being a woman is not a BFOQ for the job. The sexually provocative dress code,
imposed equally on men and women, may enhance the performance.
A preferable reading of Jespersen would permit casinos and other industries
that provide entertainment to adopt sexually provocative dress requirements for
both men and women cocktail servers, as long as the codes treat both men and
women as sexual subjects. Because men are not ordinarily considered sexual
objects, the dressing of male cocktail waiters in sexually explicit uniforms would
134
create a reaction of surprise and humor, emphasizing that the job of cocktail
server entails a performance and the server’s uniform enhances the ability of the
server to perform. This reaction makes the viewer more aware of the sexual
commodification of women that surrounds us. It serves as a playful reminder of
the viewer’s acceptance of the woman’s role as a sexual temptress and the man’s
role as an aggressor, and challenges, rather than reinforces, sexual stereotypes
135
without unduly restricting the freedom of employers.

130. See Joan W. Howarth, Adventures in Heteronormativity: The Straight Line from Liberace to
Lawrence, 5 NEV. L.J. 260, 261 (2004).
131. See id.
132. There has been minimal incursion into this “old fashioned” concept in Las Vegas. Two
shows demonstrating men as “beefcake”—”Chippendales” and the “Thunder from Down Under”—
are advertised to appeal to heterosexual women consumers. The Cirque du Soleil has a show entitled
“Zumanity” that features homosexual as well as heterosexual couples engaging in erotic behavior.
These three shows stand out among a plethora of shows exhibiting female sexuality.
133. See generally McGinley, supra note 18; McGinley, supra note 24.
134. On a personal note, I experienced a similar reaction upon entering a casino that has men
performers dressed as “beefcake.” The men were dressed in slacks and a bow tie, but no shirt. The
men selected for the performance had had their body hair waxed and were extremely muscular. My
reaction, frankly, was surprise and some discomfort. The men who bared their chests appeared
almost more naked to me than the women cocktail servers who wore very skimpy costumes.
135. There is a potential challenge to this proposal by an older worker who is considered not
sufficiently sexy for the job. The older worker could conceivably allege that the casino’s requirement
that a cocktail server be “sexy” and wear a sexy uniform has a disparate impact on men and women
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To achieve the goal of challenging sexual stereotypes, casinos should
consider the effect that the proposed uniforms would have on men and women.
For example, sexy costumes should not denote a power differential between
men and women. Because men are stereotypically considered sexy when
powerful, it would not suffice to put men in suits and women in skimpy outfits.
Rather, in order to challenge the concept of women exclusively as sex objects,
casino employers must also dress men in uniforms that portray them as sex
objects. Moreover, the same uniform on both men and women would often
impose unequal effects because of cultural norms about which parts of men’s
and women’s exposed bodies, respectively, are considered erotic. Casinos
should avoid dress requirements on men and women that might be humiliating
to one group because of social norms, but not bothersome to the other. For
example, a decision to go without a shirt would eroticize and humiliate women
more than men. A requirement that both men and women shave their heads
would, likewise, impose a heavier burden on women than on men.
Casinos should also ensure relative comfort of uniforms for men and
women. Requiring high heels for women and flat shoes for men, for example,
would impose a heavier burden on women because of the discomfort and
difficulty of serving cocktails in high heels, even though high heels may be
136
“gender appropriate” for women according to community norms.
VI. CONCLUSION
Employers who use sex appeal to entertain their customers should have the
right to do so. That right, however, should not extend to the selling of female
sexuality without the selling of its male counterpart. A fair reading of Title VII
permits an extremely narrow BFOQ defense where the very womanhood or
manhood is essential to perform the job tasks. Interpreting the BFOQ defense
very narrowly is consistent with the purposes and policies of the Act and will
limit the spread of job segregation by sex. Because both women and men can
easily perform the tasks and responsibilities of a cocktail server in a Las Vegas

because of their age. See Smith v. City of Jackson (Miss.), 544 U.S. 228 (2005) (holding that there is a
disparate impact cause of action under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, but concluding
that it is narrower than a disparate impact cause of action under Title VII because it is limited by the
“reasonable factor other than age” clause of the ADEA and because the 1991 Civil Rights Act does
not apply to the ADEA). First, I would encourage casinos to avoid disparate treatment causes of
action under the ADEA by not automatically excluding older cocktail servers because of their age.
Second, to the extent that the casino’s definition of sexy follows social norms, the sexy requirement
may have an adverse impact on older workers. I recommend that casinos hire older workers who are
attractive and fit to serve as cocktail servers. These requirements may well be considered reasonable
by the courts, and therefore, justifications for a disparate impact. By the same token, the casinos
should realize that social norms do not reflect the broad spectrum of sexual desire and that older
workers may be considered sexy by some or many customers. Finally, the inclusion of older workers
in sexy costumes would, like the inclusion of men, challenge the notion that only young women are
appropriate objects of desire.
136. It is unclear how these standards should treat a makeup requirement for women and a
prohibition for men. So long as the men are required to wear a uniform that is equally subjugating,
such a differential may pass muster. For a fascinating history of the social meaning of makeup, see
Devon Carbado, Muti Gulati & Gowri Ramachandran, The Jespersen Story: Makeup and Women at
Work, in EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION STORIES (Joel Wm. Friedman, ed., 2006).
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casino, the BFOQ defense should not protect the casino employer who hires
women exclusively as cocktail servers.
One solution to the problem of subordination is to require businesses
wishing to exploit female sexuality also to exploit male sexuality. While the
cocktail servers, both men and women, could be required to wear sexually
suggestive clothing, the presence of men in these jobs would challenge the idea
of women as sexually submissive servers. This approach would help overcome
the identification of women as sexual objects. In fact, men would also be
objectified, but their objectification would make customers more aware of the
objectification of women. Furthermore, this solution permits women cocktail
servers to continue to work in casino cocktail server jobs while simultaneously
breaking down job segregation and opening up other jobs that have previously
been unavailable to women. Permitting men to serve cocktails creates
opportunities for men to participate in good jobs that are currently held
exclusively by women. Finally, this proposal does not unduly encroach upon the
employer’s prerogatives. It presents a choice to employers of either using a
unisex image for its cocktail servers or of hiring both men and women and
dressing them in equally sexy attire.

